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Alexander J. Field*
The Relative Stability
of German and American Industrial Growth, 1880-1913:
A Comparative Analysis
1. Introduction
The industrial expansion of the German economy between 1880 and 1913 was significant¬
ly more rapid than that of the United Kingdom, and substantiaUy less volatüe than that of
the United States. Although economic historians have devoted considerable attention to
explaining the differences in rates of growth between Germany and the U.K., only a very
few scholars have addressed the differences in volatihty between German and U.S. growth.
In spite of the fact that it is primarily in comparison with the United States that the volatihty
of German industrial expansion appears so relatively mild, most suggested explanations for
this stabüity, such as increased protection in Germany, or differences in financial structure
or industrial Organization, have not been developed as part of an explicitly comparative
analysis that attempts to account both for the severity of fluctuations in the United States
and for their relative absence in Germany. Within a comparative framework, an explana¬
tion for the relative stabüity of German growth should at the same time be an explanation
for the instabüity of U.S. growth.
This paper argues that a substantial part of the explanation for these differences in
relative stabüity may be found in differences in the relative importance and volatihty of
railroad investment in the two countries during these* years. This hypothesis may also
provide the key to understanding why German growth was so relatively stable in com¬
parison with its own experience in the previous several decades, and perhaps also why the
U.S. experience in the late nineteenth Century appears historically to have been particularly
unstable.
Department of Economics, Stanford University. My greatest acknowledgement must go to Moses Abramovitz,
who facilitated the evolution of this research by giving generously of his time and insights. Robert Fogel, Char¬
les Kindleberger, Simon Kuznets and W. Arthur Lewis have also provided me with very helpful comments on
the analysis set forth here. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on German Growth
Cycies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries held at the University of Bielefeld, Federal Republic of Ger¬
many, May 25-27, 1979.
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2. The Problem
Although there are passages in the secondary literature which do suggest that the empirical
proposition noted at the start of this essay is commonly accepted, only two economists
have systematicaUy examined both the rapidity and volatüity of German industrial expan¬
sion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries within a comparative framework1.
In the final section of Secular Movements in Production and Prices2, published in 1930,
Simon Kuznets argued that the volatüity of industrial expansion tended to be directly
related to its rapidity: the faster an industry grew, the larger were its relative deviations
from trend hkely to be3. To support this generahzation, Kuznets examined production and
consumption series covering a variety of mining and manufacturing commodities in five
different countries. He first examined different industrial series within the same countries,
and then examined the same industries in different countries, in both cases calculating rank
order correlation coefficients between measures of rapidity and measures of volatüity. His
second set of calculations provided somewhat less support for his proposition than the first,
largely because ofthe anomalous position ofGermany. After comparing series on coal Out¬
put for the five countries, Kuznets noted that "The outstanding discrepancy is Germany,
where there is very rapid growth with mild cycies"4. Simüarly, he observed, after examining
pig iron Output series for the U.S., the U.K., Germany, France, and Belgium, that "The
most important single discrepancy is for Germany ... in this comparison, as in the case of
coal, Germany combines rapid development with mild cyclical fluctuations"5. Again, after
examining the steel series, he remarked: "The most important exceptions ... inciude again
Germany and the United Kingdom; the cyclical fluctuations being lower in the former than
one would expect from its rate of growth and higher in the latter"6.
But although he reported these results, Kuznets did not devote especial attention to their
explanation, beyond some remarks in the case of steel that "We may surmise that this is
due to the differences in the national Organization of the country", and in the case of coal
and copper that
"The mildness of cycies in coal may be a result of the extremely efficient Organization of the in¬
dustry in the Rheinisch Westphalian Syndicate, while the copper disturbances may have been
accelerated by the international character of the copper market. But this ispretty much a matter of
1 Walter G. Hoflmann's work, The Growth ofIndustrial Economies, trans. from German by W. O. Henderson
and W. H. ChaJoner, Manchester/England 1958 is excluded here because it is primarily concemed with chan¬
ges in the composition of manufacturing output, not with the relative amplitude of deviations from trend
growth rates.
2 Kuznets, Simon S., Secular Movements in Production andPrices: Their Nature and TheirBearing Upon Cycli¬
cal Fluctuations, Boston 1930; reprint ed., New York 1967.
3 Kuznets distinguished between cyclical fluctuations, on the one hand, and primary and secondary secular mo¬
vements, on the other. The secondary secular movements represent longer term fluctuations above and below
trend, and are the origin of the concept of long Swings, which Kuznets and others later developed.
4 Kuznets, Secular Movements, p.279.
5 Kuznets, Secular Movements, p.280.
6 Ibid.
7 Kuznets, Secular Movements, p.276.
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It is perhaps not entirely surprising that Kuznets let the matter drop: the German case,
after all, was a puzzUng anomaly which partiaUy weakened the empirical case linking
volatüity to rapidity that he was trying to estabhsh.
The second economist who has systematicaUy addressed questions of both rapidity and
volatüity is W. Arthur Lewis. In Growth and Fluctuations, 1870-1913%, published in 1978,
almost five decades after Kuznets' work, Lewis also noted the anomalous combination of
growth and nonvolatüity in the German series. After comparing the indices of industrial
output he had constructed for Germany, France, the U.K., and the U.S., Lewis wrote that
"Germany Stands out for the müdness of its fluctuations. In the whole period 1882 to 1913
there is no year in which production actually falls, and the average gap between actual Out¬
put and potential Output is much lower than for any other country"9. After noting that this
conclusion was supported by trade union statistics on unemployment10, Lewis went on to
examine the extent to which differences in the pattern of foreign trade might help explain
the relative rapidity of growth. Curiously, however, he dropped the comparative discussion
of volatüity, never to return to it.
It is indeed puzzling that the two economists who have undertaken detaüed comparative
analyses of the rapidity and volatüity of German expansion have both noted this peculiar
combination ofrapid growth and mild fluctuations, and yet have both declined to pursue an
explanation of this phenomenon. In Kuznets' case this was probably because it was
something of an anomaly. Less explicably (since the title ofhis book suggests an equal con¬
cern with fluctuations), Lewis appears to have ignored the issue because he was more in-
terested in examining the extent to which German fluctuations were in or out of phase with
expansions and contractions in the U.S. or U.K. economies. This concern with timing
rather than amplitude reflects a continuation of interests evident in previous comparative
analyses of U.K.-U.S. growth experiences11.
Given the absence of explanations of this phenomenon in the work of Kuznets and of
Lewis, it is perhaps not altogether unexpected that discussions of this issue in textbooks,
where it is addressed at aU, tend to be opaque. For example, J. H. Clapham, in his still widely
read Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914 (pubhshed in 1921)
stressed the rapidity of growth but did not emphasize nonvolatihty, although he may be
referring to it elhpticaUy in the foUowing passage if we interpret taking a lead "with ...
decision" to imply relatively lower volatüity in industrial production series:
"The period 1890-1910 is shown to have been that in which Germany took the lead in Europe
with a speed and decision which confirmed the most confident faith ofher people in their industrial
and political future. Only the U.S, - half a rieh continent - was ahead of her as an iron and steel
producer"12.
8 Lewis, W.Arthur, Growth and Fluctuations, 1870-1913, London 1978.
9 Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, p.43.
10 There are problems with these data having to do with differential selectivity in the industries covered over
time, and comparing the two countries. For what they are worth, these data show the U.K. with an average
unemployment rate of 4,3 percent (Standard deviation 1.83) as compared with 2.45 percent (Standard devia¬
tion 1.52) for Germany over the years 1888-1913 inclusive.
11 See, for example, Thomas, Brinley, Migration and Economic Growth: A Study ofGreat Britain and the At¬
lantic Economy, 2nd ed., Cambridge/England 1972.
12 Clapham, J.H., Economic Development of France and Germany 1815-1914, Cambridge/England 1963,
p.285.
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Simüarly, David Landes' treatment of this question in his more recentiy pubhshed and
also widely read text, The Unbound Prometheus, lacks precision:
"... so that once the setback of the mid- 1870's was behind her, Germany resumed her high rate of
growth. And she had not yet exhausted this momentum when the new opportunities at the end of
the Century gave her economy another push. As the result one has the impression of an un-
interrupted rise. For Germany, however, the 1890's were a watershed"13.
Even if we resolve the ambiguities regarding Landes's periodization of the German growth
experience (is he arguing that Germany grew more rapidly in the 1890's than the 1880's?),
it is stül striking that he includes here no discussion of relative nonvolatüity. One finds the
same lacuna in W. O. Henderson's comparative treatment ofGerman, French, and Russian
industriahzation in the 1815-1914 period, a treatment that also fails to mention the relative
nonvolatüity of German expansion14. On the other hand, Alan Müward and S. B. Saul, in
their Development ofthe Economies ofContinental Europe, 1850-1914, do recognize both
the speed and nonvolatüity of German industrial expansion, but they do not reaUy attempt
to explain this absence of volatihty beyond analyzing skepticaüy the hypothesis that it was
due to cartels15.
In summary, neither in detaüed comparative examinations of industrial expansion, nor
in secondary works intended primarily as texts, do we find, where the problem is addressed
at all, systematic analysis of the relative nonvolatüity of German industrial expansion.
Before attempting some Steps in the direction of such an analysis, however, it is incumbent
upon us to examine in fairly close detail the Statistical series upon which the comparative
proposition advanced at the start of this essay is based.
3. The Data
For the major industrializing countries in the late nineteenth Century we have reasonably
accurate year-to-year records on output or consumption for only a few relatively
homogenous commodities. Five ofthe most important of these are: iron ore, coal, pig iron,
and steel output, and raw cotton consumption. These physical production series cover the
two key sectoral complexes of early industrialization and, along with others, are the raw
materials from which indices of industrial output (which in turn influence estimates ofGNP
or national income) are calculated. The fluctuations in these series, if they are coUected ac-
curately, reflect overaU variations in economic activity from year to year; they remain
some of the more important indicators of economic activity in an advanced economy.
Figures 1-5 plot logged values of these physical production and consumption series for
Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. for the years 1871-1913. The beginning and end points
13 Landes, David, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western
Europe from 1750 to the Present, Cambridge/England 1969, p.236.
14 Henderson, W. O., The Industrial Revolution in Europe: Germany, France, Russia, 1815-1914, Chicago
1961.
15 Milward, Alan, and Saul, S. B., The Development ofthe Economies ofContinental Europe, 1850-1914, Cam¬
bridge/Massachusetts 1977, pp. 52-53.
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for these series reflect common historical benchmarks. By 1871 the disruptions oftrade and
cotton supply due to the American Civü War were several years in the past, Germany was
pohticaUy unifled under Prussian leadership, and Alsace-Lorraine had been ceded to the
German Empire by France. 1913 is, of course, the final year before the outbreak of World
Warl.
Figures 1-4, especiaUy 1, 3, and 4, provide striking Visual corifirmation ofthe empirical
propositions advanced at the start of this essay. Both the German and the U.S. series
appear to grow faster than the corresponding U.K. series, but the German series appear
much less subject to fluctuations than those for the United States. Although the major
problem addressed in this paper is the explanation ofthe relative nonvolatüity ofthe Ger¬
man series after 1880, we are also interested in verifying that part of the proposition ad-
duced in the introduction dealing with relative rates of growth. If we assume, as a
simplification, that the underlying trend in each series results from a constant proportional
or percent growth over the previous year's value, then logging the values of the series
makes it possible to estimate the growth rate of the untransformed series using a simple
linear regression of these logged values on a time trend and a constant. In other words, if
growth is occurring at a constant proportional rate subject to fluctuations due to a variety
of disturbing factors, then we have a process of exponential growth subject, if our OLS
assumptions are to hold, to a multiplicative disturbance term which implies, reasonably,
that the absolute values of disturbances are larger for later years or, alternatively, for larger
values of the dependent variables in a growing series.
yt=keBtevi, v~N(0,<r2) (3.1)
lnYt=lnk+Bt+vt, v~N(0,<x2). (3.2)
Ordinary least Square regressions can provide us not only with a more precise estimate of
the annual growth rate (S), but also with a summary measure ofthe extent to which the ac¬
tual series deviates from the estimated trend: the sum of squared residuals (see Table 1).
Plotting these series in logged form has several advantages. First of aU, a decUne ofone cen¬
timeter is equivalent to an equal percentage dechne, regardless ofthe position ofthe series.
Second, the absolute values of deviations from trends wül be independent ofthe metric of
the dependent variable. Thus measuring one series in thousands of bales of cotton, and the
other in metric tons, for example, wül not affect a comparison of summed squared
residuals.
Comparisons of volatüity between two time series usuaUy involve exaniining ratios of
the variance of residuals remaining after aU systematic components have been removed
from these series. Comparisons of the variance of such "white noise" processes can be
made using sums of squared residuals divided by degrees of freedom: the ratio oftwo such
estimates, each distributed as chi, wül be distributed as F, and Standard F tests can be
apphed16. Because the term volatüity is used here in a slightly less restrictive sense - to in¬
ciude aU deviations from simple exponential growth - serial correlation in the error terms
16 See Brownlee, K. A., Statistical Theory and Methodology in Science and Engineering, New York 1965,
pp. 283-285.
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Table 1: Linear Regressions of Time Trends on Data in Figures 1-5 (1880-1913)
Dependent Variable a B R2 SSR
Log of Output of Iron Ore
Germany
-85.67
(3.012)
+.0500735
(.00158822)
.9688 .264151
Log of Output of Iron Ore
U.K.
+13.44
(3.900)
-.002033
(.002057)
.0296 .442885
Log of Output of Iron Ore
U.S.
-118.20
(5.371)
+.06755
(.002832)
.9468 .839829
Log of Coal Output
Germany (nonlignite)
-65.11
(1.258)
+.04035
(.000663)
.9914 .04606
Log of Coal Output
Germany (lignite)
-107.86
(2.426)
+.06231
(.001279)
.9867 .171309
Log of Coal Output
U.K.
-25.57
(1.266)
+.01993
(.0006673)
.9654 .046629
Log of Coal Exports
U.K.
-68.09
(1.843)
+.04144
(.0009719)
.9822 .098917
Log of Coal Output
U.S. (bituminous)
-119.078
(2.546)
+.06917
(.001343)
.9881 .188851
Log of Coal Output
U.S. (anthracite)
-48.054
(3.434)
+.03115
(.001811)
.9024 .343421
Log of Pig Iron Production
Germany
-96.40
(2.344)
+.0554
(.001236)
.9843 .160004
Log of Pig Iron Production
U.K.
-6.49
(2.696)
+.008199
(.001421)
.5099 .211469
Log of Pig Iron Production
U.S.
-113.40
(5.100)
+.06474
(.002639)
.9477 .75727
Log of Steel Output
Germany
-173.00
(3.370)
+.0956
(.001777)
.9891 .330611
Log of Steel Output
U.K.
-75.68
(4.690)
+.04426
(.002473)
.9092 .64051
Log of Steel Output
U.S.
-178.75
(5.593)
+.09902
(.002949)
.9724 .910898
Log of Raw Cotton
Consumption, Germany
-69.26
(2.494)
+.03947
(.001315)
.9657 .181032
Log of Raw Cotton
Consumption, U.K.
-12,478
(2.303)
+.01007
(.001214)
.6823 .154372
Log of Raw Cotton
Consumption, U.S.
-64.74
(2.868)
+.03837
(.001512)
.9526 .239470
Sources: See Fiqures 1-5.
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remains, and F tests of relative volatüity (at least volatüity defined in the traditional sense)
are not appropriate17.
Nevertheless, the sum of squared residuals does provide a convenient summary measure
of deviations from trends: a measure independent ofthe metric ofthe series that can be
used to confirm our Visual impressions. Pairwise comparisons are reported in Table 2,
although no formal tests of significance are made.
Table 2: Ratios of Sums of Squared Residuals U.S. vs. Germany: U.K. vs. Germany
(1880-1913)
Ratio
Commodity Country Comparison of SSR's
Iron Ore U.S. vs. Germany 3.18
U.K. vs. Germany 1.68
Coal U.S. Anthracite vs. German Nonlignite 7.46
U.S. Bituminous vs. German Nonlignite 4.10
U.K. vs. German Nonlignite 1.10
U.S. Anthracite vs. German Lignite 2.00
U.S. Bituminous vs. German Lignite 1.10
U.K. vs. German Lignite .27
Pig Iron U.S. vs. Germany 4,73
U.K. vs. Germany 1.32
Steel U.S. vs. Germany 2.75
U.K. vs. Germany 1.94
Raw Cotton U.S. vs. Germany 1.32
U.K. vs. Germany .85
Sources: Figures 1-5.
17 Note that this broader definition of volatihty includes both what Kuznets calied "secondary secular move¬
ments" (eventuaUy, long Swings) and what he calied cyclical Variation. Both ofthese types ofvariations repre¬
sent deviation from exponential growth, and are included in the sum of squared residuals. The use ofan expo¬
nential form, rather than a more complex logistic or Gompertz curve is justified on the grounds that we are
examining a relatively short period (34 years inclusive). Kuznets' series, by comparison, extend back as early
as 1782 and as late as 1925. Note also that the listings of troughs in the text in general Covers only the
1880-1913 period.
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Let us examine these figures and tables more closely. Figure 1 graphs logged values of
iron ore output. After a boom and coüapse in the first half ofthe 1870's, the German series
grew steadüy over the period 1880-1913 at an annual rate ofjust over 5 percent, experienc-
ing minor downturns in 1886, 1891, 1901, and 1908. The U.K. series stagnates, perhaps
suggesting a slight downward trend, although the regression on the 1880-1913 data reveals
a statisticaUy insignificant negative trend. Marked downturns are reflected in troughs in
1887,1893,1901, 1909, and 1912. The U.S. series grows very rapidly (at an estimated rate
of over 6.7 percent a year after 1880), but appears substantiaUy more volatüe than the Ger¬
man series, an impression confirmed by the comparison in Table 2. Troughs appear in
1885, 1891, 1893, 1904, 1908, and 1911.
Figurel: Log of Iron Ore Output: 1871-1913; U.K., U.S. (metric tons)
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Figure 2 reports a variety of series on coal output. The German nonlignite series grows
fairly steadüy after 1876, experiencing slight retardations in 1892 and 1900/02. The Ger¬
man hgnite series also grows steadüy after 1871, at a slightly faster rate, estimated from the
post-1880 data at about 6.2 percent a year, vs. a httle over 4 percent a year for the non¬
lignite series. Post-1880 troughs inciude 1886, 1893, 1901, and 1910. U.K. coal output is
growing very slowly (just under 2 percent a year), with slight downturns in 1886, 1893,
1901,1908, and 1912. U.K. coal exports grow faster than output (over 4 percent a year), in¬
dicating that U.K. consumption was increasing even more slowly than U.K. coal output.
The U.S. bituminous series grows very rapidly (almost 7 percent a year); the anthracite
series more slowly (a httle over 3 percent a year), but both appear substantiaUy more
volatüe than either ofthe German series, the U.S. bituminous series evidencing troughs in
1889, 1894,1904,1908, and 1911, the anthracite series in 1894,1897,1900,1902 (the year
of a bitter coal strike), 1906, 1909, and 1912.
Figure 2: Log of Coal Output: 1871-1913; Germany, U.K., U.S. (metric tons)
13 -
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Figure 3, reporting pig iron output, reflects, as we might expect, some of the same
patterns as Figure L Both the U.S. and the German series coUapse in the middle 1870's.
After this coUapse, both series grow very rapidly (5.5 percent for Germany, 6.5 percent for
the United States over the 1880-1913 period), but the relative magnitude ofthe downturns
in the German series appears to be much smaüer than those in the U.S. series. Distinct Ger¬
man troughs, for example, appear only in 1886,1901, and 1908, whereas in the American
case, we find troughs in 1885, 1891, 1894, 1896, 1904, 1908, and 1911. The U.K. series
grows slowly (less than 1 percent a year) and appears to be intermediate between the U.S.
and Germany in its volatüity, distinct post-1880 troughs observable in 1886, 1892, 1898,
1901,1904,1908, and 1912. Note that the U.S. surpasses U.K. pig iron output for the first
time in 1889; Germany does so in 1904.
Figure 3: Log of Pig Iron Output: 1871-1913; Germany, U.K., U.S. (metric tons)
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Figure 4 presents the steel series, which are particularly interesting, because we are here
dealing with a product which is essentiaüy new for aU three countries. Although steel had
certainly been avaüable before the nineteenth Century, cheap steel was the direct result of
the development of the Bessemer Converter, the Siemens-Martin open hearth, and the
Güchrist-Thomas basic processes which were only beginning to have their impact in the
1870's. For some of the other series we might argue that for the U.S. and Germany, we
witness the middle section of a logistics curve, whereas in the U.K., a more mature
economy, we see the righthand portion of such a curve as growth tapers off. In the case of
steel, it is harder to make this argument, since it is a new product. AU three series start off
rapidly; both the U.S. and Germany starting behind Britain, but the U.S. clearly overtaking
Germany in 1875 and the U.K. in 1879. Germany overtakes the U.K. in 1893. Both Ger¬
many and the U.S. grow at rates of over 9 percent a year; the U.K. figure is closer to 4.5
percent. But once again, the U.S. series appears significantly more volatüe than the Ger¬
man (or the U.K.), with distinguishable troughs in 1884, 1888, 1891, 1893, 1896, 1900,
1904,1908, and 1911, as compared with only 1901 and 1908 for Germany and 1884,1893,
and 1908 for the U.K.
Figure 4: Log of Steel Output: 1871-1913; Germany, U.K., U.S. (metric tons)
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FinaUy, Figure 5 graphs the series on raw cotton consumption. Both the U.S. and Ger¬
many grow at a rate of a httle under 4 percent (vs. about 1 percent for the U.K.), but in this
industry, the German series does not seem to be distinguished by its relative nonvolatihty.
In sum, with the possible exception of the cotton series, the proposition that German in¬
dustrial expansion over the years 1880 to 1913 was significantly more rapid than the U.K.
expansion, and substantiaUy less volatüe than that of the United States seems to be em-
piricaüy justified by these data.
Figure 5: Log of Raw Cotton Consumption: 1871-1913; Germany, U.K.
(metric tons); U.S. (1000 bales)
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Of course, one can never entirely dismiss the possibility that these results are Statistical
artifacts. Perhaps the coverage of the German Statistical apparatus was more limited or
selective when compared with that ofthe United States. Perhaps the German data are, ifnot
biased, simply less accurate. A couple of considerations may partiaUy dispel the unease
which comes from considering such possibilities. First of aü, J. D. Clapham, writing at the
conclusion ofthe period we are examining, and basing much of his work on the published
Statistical volumes of the German govemment, was impressed with the overall quality of
these statistics. He observed, for example, that "The exceUent German industrial statistics
aUow the development (of large scale manufacturing) to be studied with a precision im¬
possible for France, England, or any other country"18. Second, the Statistical apparatus
was apparently not incapable of picking up serious downturns, as evidenced by the
coUapses or downturns reported in the iron ore, coal, pig iron, and cotton consumption
series in the mid-1870's. FinaUy, post-1880 physical production and consumption series
are probably more reliable than series that involve prices and values, and are also probably
more reliable than production data for earher periods in the nineteenth Century. These
observations give us some reason to have confidence that the phenomenon we have
isolated is not a Statistical artifact, but as Kuznets and Lewis both concluded, a real one. It
is also in need of investigation.
4. Explanations
The economic history hterature, as we have already seen, is not totaUy devoid of
suggestions as to why German industrial output was relatively stable from 1880 to 1913,
in comparison with the expansion ofthe United States during the same years, and in com¬
parison with its own volatüity in the pre-1880 period, especiaUy the 1870's. Kuznets
thought that this relative nonvolatihty might be due to the influence of cartels. Cartel
agreements were, of course, much more widespread in Germany than in the United States,
and were legaUy enforceable in courts of law, reflecting a different legal environment than
that which prevaüed in the United States, especiaUy after the passage ofthe Sherman An-
titrust Act.
Although cartels may have been partiaUy effective in smoothing out fluctuations, there
are two reasons for questioning the overall importance of their contribution to the stability
of the German industrial series. First, the number of industries that were effectively
cartelized was relatively smaU: according to Müward and Saul, only in mining, paper-mak-
ing and somewhat later, dyestuffs and organic chemicals, was more than 75 percent of Out¬
put effectively controUed19. Second, ceteris paribus, the abüity of a cartel to continue in
Operation diminishes with the severity of changes in demand or supply conditions which
confront it. For example, in coal mining, one of the most effectively cartelized industries,
"There is clear evidence that the control of markets and production stül left the industry
open to fluctuations of trade .. ."20. In noting the growth of the cartel movement, and the
relatively stable growth of German industrial output after 1880, we must beware ofthepost
18 Clapham, Economic Development, p.287.
19 Müward and Saul, Development, p.52.
20 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
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hoc ergo propter hoc faUacy. To the extent that cartels appear to have been successful in
reducing volatüity in individual industries, this may have been, paradoxicaUy, because the
economic disturbances that had led to their formation did not reappear with the same
severity after 1880.
Often associated with the emphasis on cartels is a discussion ofthe relatively greater role
which investment banks played in Germany as compared with the United States or with
England. Members of German investment banks often organized the placement of a com-
pany's equity issues, made direct loans to firms, and frequently sat on Company boards21.
Possibly these banks provided a more efficient mechanism offinancial intermediation than
existed in the United States: these institutions may have been more effective in channeüing
funds from savers who had surpluses to investors who had worthwhÜe projects. On the
other hand, economic historians who have examined the workings of the U.S. financial
system in the nineteenth Century speak very highly of its efficiency22. But whereas it may
have been relatively efficient in aUocating loanable funds between regions, it may not have
been terribly efficient in preventing periodic financial crises. Certainly it was the perception
of a historicaUy unstable financial structure that motivated the creators of the Federal
Reserve system. The role ofthe United States financial system in contributing to instabihty
in investment behavior cannot be dismissed out of hand.
Another familiär explanation is the rise of protectionist sentiment and policy in Ger¬
many. The great movement toward trade hberalization rationahzed by the writings of
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and reflected in the 1786 Eden treaty and the 1860
Cobden-Chevalier treaty between England and France, and the complete elimination ofthe
duty on foreign pig iron in Germany in the early 1870's was reversed in Germany by the
collapse of the German iron industry in the mid-1870's and the growing influx of cheap
agricultural commodities from outside of Europe. This shift from free trade to protection
happens to coincide with the beginnings of very rapid and stable growth in the late 1870's
and early 1880's. But one must be skeptical here as well. The German tariffs were not
exclusionary: Clapham argues that the tariff, at least that on manufacturers, "was never
excessive and compared favorably, from the point of view of an exporting manufacturer in
another country, with that of most great powers"23. Furthermore, effective levels of protec¬
tion in the U.S. were far greater throughout this period than those in Germany, making it
difficult to use the presence of increasing protection in Germany after 1880 as a simple
explanation ofthe differences between the stability ofthe industrial expansions ofthese two
countries.
Some writers have suggested that export Performance may help explain the relative
rapidity of German growth as compared with England. In addition to her efficient iron and
steel sector, Germany developed internationaUy competitive engineering, electrical
machinery and chemical industries, and competed effectively against British manufac¬
turers in markets, especially Continental markets, that England had formally dominated24.
21 For a study based on archival and econometric evidence ofthe role of private banks and Kreditbanken in fa¬
cilitating industrial investment, see Neuberger, Hugh, German Banks and German Economic Growthfrom
Unification to World War 1, New York 1977.
22 Davis, Lance, u.a., American Economic Growth: An Economists History ofthe United States, New York
1972, Chapter 10.
23 Clapham, Economic Development, p. 322.
24 HofTman, Ross, J.S., Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalary 1875-1914, Philadelphia 1933.
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Is it possible that the key to the nonvolatüity of her expansion is also to be found in the
export structure? Was Germany, because of its Strategie geophysical Situation, facing both
toward Central Europe and toward the Atlantic, perhaps insulated from shocks peculiar to
one or the other region? Some economic historians have indeed argued, at least implicitly,
that the greater relative volatüity of demand for U.S. exports, particularly cotton and
wheat, may have been associated with the relative severity of fluctuations in its industrial
sector. On the other hand, Germany was not a small country industrializing primarily as
the result of export-led growth (although in absolute terms, Germany had, by the start of
the First World War, become the world's second largest exporter). With a relatively
affluent population of almost 65 mülion in 1910, Germanyhad a very large internal market.
Henderson, for example, remarks that the growth ofthe German iron industry was based
primarily on the internal market25. An explanation ofthe relative nonvolatüity ofthe Ger¬
man vs. the U.S. industrial series based on export structure would have to argue (a) that
volatihty in export demand had a significant impact on the volatüity of domestic produc¬
tion, and (b) that the demands for German exports were, on balance, relatively more stable
than those for exports from the United States.
This discussion of exports, generaUy considered a component of autonomous expen¬
diture, is an appropriate point to ask from a theoretical perspective where we should expect
to find the sources of instabihty in an industrializing economy. Suppose we consider a very
simple Keynesian model of income determination, in which aggregate demand is a function
of consumption expenditures, investment, govemment expenditure, and exports less im¬
ports, with consumption and imports each a linear function of income:
Y= C+I + G+ X-M (4.1)
C=a+ßY (4.2)
M=y+ <5Y (4.3)
which reduces to
(q-v + I + G+ X)
d-ß+ ö)
V '
The fundamental distinction in this simple model is between variables which are exogenous,
or autonomous (I, G, X), and those which are not (C, M, and Y). Of course, I, G and X are
never totaUy independent ofthe level of domestic economic activity, past and present. But
as a first approximation, it may be helpful to assume that they are, which implies that the
sources of instabüity in aggregate demand are to be located in one or some combination of
the three components of autonomous expenditure: I, G, or X. In comparison with the twen¬
tieth Century, G was relatively unimportant at this time. As indicated above, export
behavior does Warrant scrutiny. But for the moment, let us focus on the third component of
autonomous expenditure, investment.
Li the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, two of the most important com¬
ponents of gross and net investment were expenditures on residential construction and
expenditures on the construction of raüroads. Between 1879 and 1908, U. S. Gross New
25 Henderson, Industrial Revolution in Europe, p. 68.
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Construction totaUed over 14 percent of GNP - almost two thirds of total Gross Capital
Formation (21.6 percent of GNP). Housing and raüroads, in turn, were a large fraction of
total construction: Between 1880 and 1899 non-farm residential construction averaged 41
percent of all gross new construction and expenditures on railroad construction averaged
19.4 percent26. The large and often extremely volatüe residential housing cycle has indeed
played an important part in our understanding of cychcal fluctuations in advanced
economies27. W. Arthur Lewis, in Growth and Fluctuations, reports graphically two series
for each ofthe four core industrial economies he studied: one is a series ofindustrial output
indices, the other a series of deviations from trend in indices of construction activity28.
After the 1870's, the German construction plot hugs the horizontal axis, in comparison
with the corresponding series for the other core countries. Simply examining these graphs,
one might conclude that the relative stability ofthe growth ofGerman industrial output was
due to or at least associated with the relative nonvolatüity of its construction sector.
Lewis refers to upswings in these series sometimes as buüding booms and sometimes as
construction booms. The usage is confusing: a building boom might mean a boom in one
component of construction (structures) or it might mean a boom in aU construction activi¬
ty. This confusion is not clarified by looking behind Lewis's German construction series,
which consists before 1890 solely of Hoffmann's series on timber production, and after
1890, solely of timber and bricks29. If the hypothesis one derives from Lewis's graphs is
that the German residential construction cycle was less volatüe than that ofthe U.S., one
would have to object on the basis of work by Manuel Gottheb. Gottheb has attempted to
document long swings in German residential construction using tax, building permit, and
insurance data, and his data show that there are cycies within German residential construc¬
tion expenditure that are as important as those which characterize the American buüding
series30.
Railroad construction, by contrast, is not emphasized by Lewis. Although post-1880
expenditures on railroad construction in both countries are generally less than those for
residential construction, there is a long tradition in American economic history that
emphasizes the importance of the railroad in nineteenth Century economic development.
Fifteen years ago Robert Fogel challenged that tradition, citing critically Herman Kroos's
general description of the railroad as "the principal single determinant of the levels of in¬
vestment, national income, and employment in the nineteenth Century"31. More specifical-
26 Abramovitz, Moses, Evidence ofLong Swings in Aggregate Construction Since the Civil War, NBER Oc-
casional Paper No. 90, New York 1964, pp 13-14 The first calculation is based on current pnces. The second
uses 1919 pnces.
27 See, for example, Long, Clarence D , Jr, Building Cycies and the Theory ofInvestment, Pnnceton 1940;
Hickman, Bert G., Growth and Stability of the Postwar Economy, Washington 1960, pp 306 ff
28 Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, pp. 18, 23
29 Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, pp 270-271
30 Gottheb, Manuel, Long Swings in Urban Development, New York 1976, p 325.
31 See Fogel, Robert W , Raüroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History, Balti¬
more 1964, pp. 9, 129-206; Kroos, Herman E , American Economic Development, Englewood Cliffs 1959,
p. 439. Indeed, Fogel's finding that the backward hnkages were relatively weak in the United States between
1840 and 1860 combined with Fremdling's finding that the hnkages in Germany were relatively strong over
a simüiar penod in one sense nicely complements my hypothesis that the relative importance ofthe hnkages
in the post 1880 penod in the two countries was reversed It also suggests that, cetens paribus, ifwe compare
the growth expenence ofthe countnes in the 1880-1913 period with, let us say, the 1840-1860 or 1840-1880
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ly, Fogel chaUenged Walt Rostow's emphasis on the railroad as a leading sector in the
economic growth of the United States, by attempting to estimate the strength of the
backward hnkages from the railroad to the coal, iron, machinery, transport equipment, and
lumber sectors during the years 1840 to 1860. This is a legitimate procedure since Rostow
does identify the takeoff in the United States with the years 1843 to 1860. Nevertheless,
Fogel's work does not examine backward hnkages in the post-Civü War pre-World War I
period, in spite of the fact that his social savings calculations apply to 1890. Even the
Hmited amount of data surveyed in this essay suggest that at least for the 1880-1913 period,
Kroos's Statement cannot be dismissed out of hand.
In contrast to Fogel, Rainer Fremdling has resurrected Rostow's argument that railroad
investment acted as an important leading sector in nineteenth Century economic
development, by arguing on the one hand that for Germany Rostow's characterization is
eminently reasonable, and on the other hand that Fogel and Hawke have dismissed too
lightly Rostow's case for, respectively, the U.S. and U.K. economies32. Similarly, Carl
Holtfrerich, examining the 1851-1892 period, concluded that it was raüroads, rather than
coal, that qualify for designation as a leading sector in Germany33. Reinhard Spree's work
on German growth and cycies between 1840 and 1880 also emphasizes the very influential
role ofrailroad investment in determining the level ofoveraU economic activity during these
years34.
However, the time periods covered in all three of these analyses tend to precede the
tremendous expansion of industrial output in Germany in the decades before the First
World War. It may weh be that the relative importance of German raüway investment
between 1840 and 1880 precluded its playing as influential a role in the period after 1880, at
least in comparison with the Situation in the United States. If one examines a map of the
German raüway network, even as early as 1850, one is Struck by the extent to which the
main elements ofthat net are already in place35. The U.S. was a very much larger country.
Even though the U.S. population was only 42 percent greater than the German population
in 1910 (92.4 vs. 64.9 mülion), the entire German empire, including Alsace Lorraine, and
.
the territories which are now part of Poland and the Soviet Union, could comfortably have
been squeezed into the single American State of Texas. Partly because of its larger size and
relatively lower population density, American raüway investment tended to be much larger
absolutely and in comparison to total population or total industrial output.
U.S. raüway trackage peaked in 1916 with a little over a quarter million miles (410,268
küometers) of raüway track owned. The German trackage peaked in 1913 at 63,378
küometers. Therefore, although U.S. population was only a httle more than 1.4 times Ger¬
man population in 1910, its peak raü trackage was almost 6.5 times that of Germany. Ifwe
period, U. S. growth should have been more uneven in the latter period than the earlier period, whereas in Ger¬
many, the reverse should have been true.
32 Fremdling, Rainer, Railroads and German Economic Growth: A Leading Sector Analysis with a Compa¬
rison to the United States and GreatBritain, in: Journal ofEconomic History, Vol. 37 (1977), 3, pp. 583-604.
33 Holtfrerich, Carl-L., Quantitative Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Ruhrkohlenbergbaus im 19.Jahrhundert,
Dortmund 1973, p. 184.
34 Spree, Reinhard, Die Wachstumszyklen der deutschen Wirtschaft von 1840 bis 1880, Berlin 1977,
pp. 261-330.
35 Kobschätzky, Hans, Streckenatlas der Deutschen Eisenbahnen, 1834-1892, Düsseldorf 1971.
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take these figures as indicating the high water marks for the diffusion of this revolutionary
transportation innovation, we can work backward and ask what percent ofthe "final" raü
net was in place in various years. Performing this calculation for 1880 (Table 5), we find,
somewhat unexpectedly, that the final U.S. raü net was only a little more than a third com¬
plete at that date, whereas the German net was already more than half in place. The U.K.
net, by comparison, was more than three-quarters complete.
Table 3: Percent of Final Raüway Net Complete, 1880
1880 Peak
Trackage Trackage .% Complete
U.K.---7 25,060 32,349 (1928) 76.3
a/
Germany— 33,838 63,378 (1913) 53.4
u.s.y 148,385 410,268 (1916) 36.2
a/
Length of raüway line open as reported in Mitchell (1976),
pp. 583-584 (küometers).
-1880: Road owned, as reported in Historical Statistics II
(1975), Series Q-322, p. 731 (converted to küometers).
1916: Road owned, as reported in Historical Statistics II
(1975), Series Q-287, p. 728 (converted to küometers).
Figure 6 plots the percent ofthe final raü net in place against time from 1830 to 1913 for
both the U.S. and for Germany. Although the U.S. is actually ahead of Germany in 1841,
after 1845, a decisive gap opens up between the two countries, a gap which is un¬
derestimated shghtly for the pre-1871 figures because the German data do not inciude
Alsace-Lorraine trackage. The graph also contains a plot ofthe percentage point difference
between the completion levels of the raü net in the two countries, a gap which peaks in
1879. The American percentage completed then rises rapidly, almost to meet the German
figure in 1893, but then falls back again, rising again toward the German figure in 1908. In
comparison with Germany, it is clear that the U.S. had, in 1880, a substantiaUy larger frac¬
tion of its raü net still to be laid down.
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Figure 6: Percent of Final Raü Net Complete; Germany and the U.S.: 1830-1913
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If one calculates the first differences in cumulated track length, one has a rough proxy for
net investment in raüroads36. It is only a proxy because it does not capture the increasing
importance ofinvestment in double tracking, switching yards, more complex rolling stock,
stronger bridges, curve straightening, and so forth, which causes the net investment figures
in the U.S., for example, to peak in 1910, substantiaUy after the annual additions to track
mües peaks37. Nevertheless, the turning points ofthe investment or raü consumption series
do correspond roughly with turning points ofthe net additions to trackage series38. Figure 7
plots the values of these annual net additions for Germany and the United States. Not only
are these increments substantiaUy larger on average in the U.S. than in Germany, but the
36 Spree, Die Wachstumszyklen, p. 270.
37 Kuznets, Simon, Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and Financing, Princeton 1961, p.328.
38 Abramovitz, Evidence of Long Swings, p.28.
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US. series is more volatüe. At the peak ofthe raü boom in 1887, U.S. steel output was a
little more than 2.4 times that ofGermany, but the U.S. net increment to trackage was more
than 18.4 times the German increment. By contrast, in the railroad trough in 1897, U.S. net
additions to trackage were only 2.6 times the German, and the steel multiple had dropped
to 1.8. To some degree the relative stabüity ofthe German increments to trackage series
may reflect the nationalization ofthe Prussian raüroads after 188039. But a more obvious
factor is simply that a significantly larger fraction of the German raü net had already been
completed as of 1880.
Figure7: Net Increments to Trackage (küometers); Germany and the U.S.: 1872-1913
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39 Fremdling, Rainer, Freight Rates and State Budget: The Role of the Nationalized Prussian Railways
1880-1913,, in: Journal of European Economic History (forthcoming).
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If one views the volatüity of the investment sector (and perforce, the economy as
a whole) as largely due to a combination of a residential housing sector in Germany as
volatüe as that in the U.S. (24 million more people hved in German cities of more than
2,000 in 1910 than had in 1870, and they aU had to be housed)40 and a railroad component
which was (a) correlated with the construction cycle in both countries, (b) much more
volatüe in the U.S., and (c) much larger and relatively more important in the U.S. than in
Germany41, one may begin to understand why the volatüity that appears in the U.S. iron
ore, coal, pig iron, and steel (but not cotton) series is substantiaUy greater than that ap-
parent in the corresponding German industrial output series. For railroad construction had
a dual influence on the demand for iron and steel and related produets. In addition to a
direct demand for raus, locomotives and other equipment, there were indirect multiplier
effects resulting from the armies of raüway construction workers assembled. When these
were laid off, not only did direct demand for rails and locomotives drop, but so too did
demand for consumer iron and steel using durables.
Let us go back to Figure 7. The U.S. additions to trackage series bottoms out nine times
between 1880 and 1913: in 1885,1890,1892,1895,1897,1901,1905,1909, and 1912. Now
turn back to Figure 4. The U.S. output of steel also bottoms out nine times during these
same years: in 1884,1888,1891,1893,1896,1900,1904,1908, and 1911, exactly one year
in each case (except for 1888 and 1893 which lead by two years) before additions to track
müeage bottoms out. This is not to suggest that fluctuations in iron and steel output were
causing fluctuations in the raüroad series; rather, that the additions to trackage represent
the coming onstream of projects which had had their impact on the steel industries
somewhat earlier. Simüar, but somewhat less striking relationships exist between the pig
iron/iron ore and coal troughs and the additions to trackage series.
What about Germany? The German additions to trackage series also bottoms out nine
times over this 34 year period - in 1881,1889,1891, 1893,1896, 1899, 1902/3, 1907, and
1913. By contrast, these fluctuations appear to have had very Httle effect on any ofthe Ger¬
man industrial series, which bottom out, in general, much less frequently than the com¬
parable U.S. series. The decline in additions to trackage in 1893 appears to have had no
effect on any ofthe German industrial series. On the other hand, the 1896 trough in Ger¬
man iron ore and pig iron output is not echoed in the raüroad figures at aU.
More systematicaUy, equations 4.5 and 4.6 attempt to explain changes in logged steel
output by logged increases in raüroad trackage for the subsequent year. We also inciude in
these regressions a time trend (YR) and a YR2 term to take account of the curvature of
these series, and reduce somewhat the serial correlation in the error terms. Results indicate
a statisticaUy significant elasticity of. 19 for the United States, and a smaU and statistically
insignificant elasticity in the German case (t statistics are in parentheses)42. Roughly speak-
40 Clapham, Economic Development, p. 278. Between 1871 and 1910 German rural population remained con¬
stant at about 26 million, but the urban population grew from a little under 15 million to almost 39 million.
41 Lewis, for example, when combining his indices of mining and manufacturing with the construction index,
uses weights of 9 and 1 in Germany, vs. .857 and .142 for the United States. See Lewis, Growth andFluctua-
tions, pp. 271, 274.
42 If one runs the U.S. regression including a YR3 and a YR4 variable, the Durbin Watson statistic rises to 1.46
(still in the grey area), the estimate on the trackage variable drops to .165, with a t statistic of 3.52. In an unpu¬
blished memorandum, J. Krengel has questioned the method of construeting the steel series reported in Mit¬
chell. However, these regression results are not modified if one uses as a dependent variable in the German
case Krengers series for steel production.
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ing, this means that if the U.S. increment to trackage is to go up 100 percent next year, we
would predict that U.S. steel output would go up by about 19 percent this year, based on the
estimates from these regressions.
United States*
lnSTEEL = 0.19241nTRACKA+1 +6.937YR- .0018YR2-6668.7 (4.5)
(3.645) (7.747) (-7.613) (-7.873)
R2=.9845 D.W.= 1.1316
Germany*
lnSTEEL=.02561n TRACKA+1 + 4.768YR-.0012YRM604.81 (4.6)
(.8009) (12.30) (-12.03) (-12.55)
R2=.9966 D.W. = 1.0346
The final figure in this paper, Figure 8, plots Hoffmann's series on investment in German
raüroads and investment in nonagricultural residential construction in current prices for
the years 1851-1913. This table shows that the relative importance of German raüroad in¬
vestment in comparison with investment in residential housing declined dramaticaüy in the
early 1880's. Raüroad investment in Germany averaged only about 26 percent of in¬
vestment in residential construction between 1880 and 1913, and after 1884, rose above 33
percent (slightly) in only 5 years. By contrast, in the United States, railroad investment
averaged 47 percent of investment in residential housing between 1880 and 1899 and over
53 percent between 1890 and 191343. These data provide further support for the proposi¬
tion that because ofthe relatively early completion ofa substantial fraction ofthe final Ger¬
man raü net, the relative importance and volatüity ofGerman raüway investment dechned
in the late nineteenth Century. The relative unimportance of this traditionaUy volatüe com¬
ponent of investment may provide a partial explanation both for the relative stabüity of in¬
dustrial growth in Germany after 1880, and for its relative stabüity vis-a-vis the industrial
expansion of the United States, a much larger, less densely settied country, that stül had a
very large fraction of its raü net to lay down. That process, in retrospect, was not a smooth
or continuous one.
5. Conclusion
The argument that fluctuations in industrial Output in the United States were related to
fluctuations in U.S. railroad investment leaves open the question of why U.S. raü In¬
vestment was so volatüe. Moses Abramovitz has suggested that raüroad booms may in
*n = 41 (1872-1912); the method of estimation was ordinary least Squares.
43 Abramovitz, Moses, Evidence ofLong Swings in Aggregate Construction Since the Civil War, NBER Oc-
casional Paper No. 90, New York 1964, p. 15. These statistics are derived from Abramovitz' table ofthe com¬
position of gross new construction in 1919 prices in various years.
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Figure 8: Investment in Raüroads and Housing; Germany: 1851-1913
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part have been related to booms in demand for U.S. exports such as wheat and cotton.As a
result of these booms and the Operation ofthe gold Standard, argues Abramovitz, nominal
income increased in the U.S., and raüway profits soared, since the marginal costs of the
traffic increases associated with the export booms were relatively low. The increased cash
flow not only made possible increased finance by retained earnings, but also made it easier
to float equity issues by buoying share prices, and made it easier to float loans (issue bonds)
by improving credit ratings. The undertaking of large lumpy construction projects, in turn,
sustained an industrial boom weU beyond the period in which it would have faltered in the
absence of the projects until eventuaUy, as immigration slowed, housing construction
faltered, and imports of British financial capital tapered off, the boom coUapsed44.
44 Abramovitz, Moses, The Passing ofthe Kuznets Cycle, in: Economica (1968), pp. 349-367; The Monetary
Side ofLong Swings in U.S. Growth, CREG Memorandum No. 146, Stanford/California (1973).
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Although Abramovitz carefuUy qualifies aU of these propositions, his analysis does
suggest that, on balance, raüroad investment responded to revivals in commercial con¬
ditions. By contrast, John Partington examined the 1870-1926 period, and concluded that
"in a majority of business revivals... raüroad buying revived some months before commer¬
cial and industrial activity appears to have begun its recovery"45. This difference in
emphasis indicates that the factors lying behind the volatüity ofthe U.S. raü trackage series
are in need of further investigation. In understanding the volatüity of U.S. raü investment, it
is also of some importance to investigate the proportion of such investment that involved
extensions of lines into previously unserved agricultural hinderland, as opposed to the con¬
struction of new trunk lines. In the case of the latter, there would presumably have been a
much greater incentive to continue building to completion regardless of business con¬
ditions, whereas in the former case, one might have been more willing to stop in midstream,
since a partiaUy completed project could stül generate income.
Although more research is needed on the determinants of the volatüity of U.S. raü in¬
vestment, an initial step in explaining the differences in volatüity of industrial output series
in the U.S. and Germany is the recognition ofthe critical importance ofthe relative size and
volatüity of raü investment in these two countries after 1880 and before World War I. In his
work on the United States, Simon Kuznets identified both raüroads and residential con¬
struction as "population sensitive" in the sense that they were associated with "long
Swings" in migration46. Although investment in residential construction does appear to
have been sensitive to Swings in migration in both countries, investment in German
raüroads, at least after 1880, does not, especially in comparison with the United States47.
Comparative analyses often reveal problems which may not be apparent when one
focusses solely on one country. In the 1970's, German economists have viewed single digit
annual rates of price increase as evidence of rampant inflation, which seems exaggerated
from the Standpoint of American or British observers. Similarly, many scholars, in focuss-
ing on the absolute levels of late nineteenth Century German fluctuations, may have faüed
adequately to consider what is really the more striking phenomenon: the relative absence of
fluctuations when compared with other rapidly growing industrial economies, especially
that ofthe United States. This paper has tried to remedy this Situation by focussing within a
comparative framework on some ofthe characteristics ofthe German economy which may
have been associated with its record, after 1880 and before World War I, of rapid growth
with mild fluctuations.
45 Partington, John E., Railroad Purchasing and the Business Cycle, Washington/D.C. 1929
46 Kuznets, Simon, Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and Financing, Princeton 1961
47 Indeed, according to many historians, it was the raü net itself that stimulated much ofthe German migration
by lowenng transport costs and speeding the diffusion of Information on employment opportunities in the in¬
dustrial and mining areas Clapham quotes Treitschke. "It was the railways which first dragged the nation
from its economic Stagnation; they ended what the Zollverein had only begun, with such power did they break
in upon all the old habits of work, that already in the forties the aspect ofGermany was completely changed
"
Clapham, Economic Development, p 150
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6. Summary
German industrial expansion in the period 1880-1913 was significantly more rapid than
that ofthe United Kingdom, and substantiaUy less volatüe than that ofthe United States. A
partial explanation for the relatively stable growth path ofthe German economy during the¬
se years may be found in the greater relative importance and volatüity ofthe railroad con¬
struction component of net investment in the United States. By 1880 only a httle over one-
third ofthe U.S. final raü net was in place, compared with over halfin the case ofGermany.
Compared to Germany, railroad investment in the United States between 1880 and World
War I was, on average, much larger absolutely. It was also much larger in comparison to
total population, total industrial output, and in comparison to expenditures on residential
construction. In addition, it was more volatüe. The lesser importance and volatüity of
this component of autonomous expenditure in the German case partiaUy accounts for the
relative nonvolatüity of the German industrial Output series.
Zusarnmenfassung: Vergleichende Analyse der relativen Stabilität
des industriellen Wachstums in Deutschland und den USA,
1880-1913
Die deutsche Industrie wuchs von 1880 bis 1913 deutlich rascher als die Großbritanniens
und unter geringeren Schwankungen als die der USA. Hier wird folgender Erklärungsan¬
satz vorgeschlagen: Im Jahre 1880 war in den USA erst etwas mehr als ein Drittel des
endgültigen Eisenbahnnetzes fertiggestellt, in Deutschland dagegen schon mehr als die
Hälfte. Zwischen 1880 und 1913 war der Umfang der Eisenbahnbau-Investitionen in den
USA durchschnittlich erheblich größer als in Deutschland. Diese besaßen auch ein stärke¬
res Gewicht, z.B. im Vergleich zur Gesamtbevölkerung, zur industrieUen Produktion und
zu den Wohnungsbau-Investitionen. Noch bedeutsamer aber war vieUeicht ihre starke
Fluktuation. Die größere Stabilität der deutschen Eisenbahnbau-Investitionen und ihr klei¬
ner AnteÜ am gesamtwirtschaftlichen Investitionsvolumen erklären zum Teü, warum das
Wachstum der deutschen Industrie während des Untersuchungszeitraums relativ geringe
Schwankungen aufwies.
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Appendix: Sources of Figures
Figure 1:
Germany: B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970, New York 1976, p. 388; based
on W.G. Hoffmann, u. a., Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des W.Jahrhun¬
derts, Berlin usw. 1965, based in turn primarily on Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich
(1880-1914) and Statistik des Deutschen Reichs (1873-1914).
U.K.: Mitchell (1976), based on Statistical Abstract ofthe United Kingdom (1871-1914).
U. S.: U. S. Bureau ofthe Census, Historical Statistics ofthe United States, Colonial Times to 1970,
Washington 1975, Part 1, pp. 599-600, Series M-205. Yearly data available commencing in 1881.
Figure 2:
Germany: Mitchell (1976), p.362, based on Hoffmann (1965).
U.K.: Mitchell (1976), pp.364, 411.
U.S.: U.S. Bureau ofthe Census (1975) I, pp.589-90, 592-93; Series M-93 and M-123.
Figure 3:
Germany: Mitchell (1976), p.393.
U.K.: Mitchell (1976), p.393.
U.S.: U.S. Bureau ofthe Census (1975) I, pp. 599-600, Series M-217.
Figure 4:
Germany, U.K.: Mitchell (1976), pp.399-400.
U.S.: U.S. Bureau ofthe Census (1975) II, pp. 693-94, Series P-265.
Figure 5:
Germany: Mitchell (1976), pp.429-30 (Net Imports of Raw Cotton).
U.K.: Mitchell (1976), pp.429-30 (Estimated Raw Cotton Consumption).
U.S.: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) II, p.689, Series P-228 (Raw Cotton Used in Textiles).
Figures 6, 7:
Germany: Mitchell (1976), Series G-l, pp.583-584.
U.S.: U.S. Bureau ofthe Census, Historical Statistics II (1975). 1830-1870: Road operated, Series
Q-321; 1871-1890: Road owned, Series Q-322; 1891-1913: Road owned, Series Q-287
(pp. 728-731).
Figure 8:
W.G. Hoffmann, Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft, Table 42, pp.259-260.
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